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Reason Scheme: A Critical Analysis
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Postgraduate Program of Islamic Studies, Postgraduate School of Syarif Hidayatullah State
Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta
Jl. Kertamukti No. 5, East Ciputat, South Tangerang, Banten 15419
Indonesia
Email: mic.caniago@gmail.com

ABSTRAK
Tulisan ini mencoba untuk mengkaji ulang sejumlah gagasan dari beberapa sarjana
dan intelektual Indonesia, seperti Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno dan Syamsul Ma’arif,
yang melihat dan menggambarkan relasi antara Pancasila dengan public reason, salah
satu konsep politik yang cukup populer dalam studi politik. Sejumlah sarjana dan intelektual Indonesia tersebut membingkai Pancasila dengan public reason dalam gambaran yang bernuansa sekuler sehingga berpotensi melepaskan kontribusi dari yang
seharusnya dapat dilakukan oleh agama. Turunan dari public reason yang bermasalah
tersebut di antaranya (1) prinsip negasi terhadap mayoritarianisme, (2) prinsip negara
netral, dan (3) prinsip substansial dalam agama (universalisme). Dengan penelaahan
kualitatif yang merujuk pada sejumlah argumen baik filosofis maupun historis, maka
dapat ditunjukkan bahwa argumen yang diberikan ketiga sarjana di atas beserta sejumlah sarjana lain yang mendukung dan memiliki gagasan serupa, dinilai memiliki sejumlah masalah. Kemudian dari penelaahan tersebut, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pemikiran
yang mendukung relasi Pancasila dengan public reason secara sekuler tidak kuat secara
argumen dan tidak dipertahankan. Sehingga, relasi Pancasila dengan public reason bisa
ditelaah ulang dengan konsep yang lebih ramah terhadap kontribusi agama.
Kata kunci: pancasila, public reason, mayoritarianisme, universalisme, negara netral
ABSTRACT
This research tries to review a number of ideas of some Indonesian scholars such as
Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif, who saw and described the relationship between Pancasila and public reason, one of the popular political concepts
in political studies. Some Indonesian scholars have linked Pancasila to public reason,
with a secular nuance, so that it could potentially be free of religious associations. The
troubled derivatives of public reason include (1) the negation of the principle of majoritarianism, (2) the neutral state principle, and (3) substantial elements in religion,
such as the principle of universalism. With a qualitative study referring to a number of
philosophical and historical arguments, it can be shown that the arguments given by the
three aforementioned scholars, and others who share similar ideas, were considered
to have a number of issues. From this review, it can be concluded that the thinking that
supports the relationship between Pancasila and public reason is weak in terms of the
secular argument. Therefore, the relation between Pancasila and public reason can be
reviewed with more approachable ideas regarding religious contributions.
*The author is a student of the Postgraduate Program of Islamic Studies, Postgraduate School
of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta.
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I N T RODUC T ION

Debates regarding the meaning of Pancasila have gone through
various stages of discussion. In the Soekarno era, these debates were
related to the existence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
which in many ways contributed to the interpretation of Pancasila. At
that time, PKI was having an intense debate with Islamic groups represented by Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama. Both groups attacked each
other through their different interpretations of the ideology of Pancasila.
In the Soeharto era, there were hardly any debates on the meaning
of Pancasila because the interpretation of the philosophy was almost
completely monopolized by the authorities. Instead, there was a single
interpretation of Pancasila. The Soeharto government even succeeded
in forcing a number of Islamic mass organizations to accept Pancasila
as their sole philosophy while forbidding other ideologies to be used.
Debates over the interpretation of Pancasila began to re-emerge in
the reform era (reformasi), especially when the practice of democracy
was adopted on a large scale. Consequently, this had an impact on both
the arguments and ideas regarding the relationship between state and
religion, including their inherent dynamics. These debates increasingly
gained momentum when the House of Representatives (DPR) began
discussions on the Law of Mass Organizations and presented some
crucial articles, especially those that proposed Pancasila as the sole philosophy. The peak of the debate about Pancasila and its interpretation
was when the government created a policy to “get rid of” the Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia organization, which was thought to have a deviant
understanding of Pancasila and was considered a threat to the existence
of the state. In such an important time in history, the debates about
Pancasila and its interpretation became important.
One important part of the interpretation of Pancasila that is often
discussed by scholars and intellectuals is the concept of public reason
initiated by John Rawls, which was later linked to Pancasila itself. The
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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notion of public reason is intriguing as this concept is quite famous
among political theorists and state philosophers. It has been discussed
and debated many times and has become an ideological battleground
that challenges the minds of intellectuals. Moreover, a number of Indonesian scholars now often associate the concept of public reason with
Pancasila in terms of the state ideology. The two emerged for relatively
similar reasons, which were to bridge the social plurality that exists in
the midst of a political community. Therefore, it is important to discuss
and review the concept of public reason in terms of its connection to
Pancasila.
However, trying to relate Pancasila to public reason, as a number of
Indonesian scholars have done, is no simple matter. First, even though
they share the same core concept, namely, diversity, public reason is
actually a foreign principle that is not necessarily right to adapt because
different social and historical conditions will come into conflict with
this philosophy. Public reason comes from a Western tradition with
a different social and historical background from that of Indonesia.
Second, the characteristics of public reason tend to be skeptical and
distanced from religion, whereas Pancasila is characterized by strong,
explicit influences of religion. This indicates an incongruency (which of
course must be proven) between the two ideas. This issue can provide
the first step to reconsider the relation between Pancasila and public
reason. Therefore, the author has developed two important questions in
order to examine in more depth the relation between the two concepts:
(1) How has the relationship between Pancasila and public reason been
described by a number of Indonesian scholars? (2) Does the relation
provide valid arguments?
The author argues that a number of scholars, such as Yudi Latif,
Franz-Magnis Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif, have interpreted Pancasila
in the framework of public reason with all its derivative forms (antimajoritarianism, the neutral state, and universalism). However, public
reason with its three derivative forms has problems that have implications for the validity of the relationship between Pancasila and public
reason, which the author will discuss in more detail. These problems
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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have forced Indonesian scholars to think and act in a critical manner
in terms of how the two concepts are related and how Pancasila is interpreted in terms of public reason.
R ESE A RCH M E T HOD

This study is divided into two parts. The first part describes a number of scholars who support and see Pancasila as having a strong relationship with public reason. The selected scholars include Yudi Latif,
Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif. This section will examine
how some Indonesian scholars constructed their arguments to justify
the relationship between Pancasila and public reason. The second discussion will review and determine whether the arguments put forward
by the aforementioned scholars do indeed show that there are strong
relations between Pancasila and public reason. To analyze the train of
thought of the scholars, philosophical and historical approaches are
used. These approaches will also review the commonly existing derivatives of the idea of public reason, i.e., (1) the concept of the negation of
majoritarianism, (2) the concept of a neutral state, and (3) the substantial principle of religion (universalism).
PU BL IC R E A SON A N D PA NC A SIL A : A N
I N T E L L EC T UA L PER SPEC T I V E

The concept of public reason in the context of its true meaning
had emerged long before Rawls used it. A number of classical political thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, are said to
have referred to public reason as an important element in the study of
political philosophy. Hobbes, for example, speaks of public reason in the
context of an absolute state, with many disagreements about social conditions, particularly those regarding beliefs or religious doctrines. Such
situations, for Hobbes, require an arbitrator to be an absolute mediator,
which is the state. Here the state serves as the public reason that mediates conflicts or controversies. Yet the meaning of public reason here
is far from the meaning used by modern political scholars, as public
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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reason falls under state absolutism, although initially Hobbes wanted
to mediate the diversity of various religious beliefs within society. This
is a similar situation to that of the emergence of the concept of public
reason (Chambers 2009, 352–354).
Immanuel Kant, a scholar well known for the concept of the public
use of reason, is considered to be the closest to the meaning of modern
public reason. The core idea of the public use of reason is what makes
an individual or community know how they should act. For Kant, the
public use of reason is an idea that is distinct from the group and moves
toward universalism. Thus, Kant directs public reason to the truth or
reason produced through persuasion, arguments, and criticism, which
all exist as a result of freedom. In other words, public reason arises in
different ways when individuals are able to communicate and argue
in a peaceful manner in order to reach mutually agreed resolutions
(Chambers 2009, 363).
This idea developed by Kant was then utilized by Rawls to address
questions and issues in diverse societies (Rawls 1996, 213–214).1 How
are diverse communities able to maintain their stability, while diversity
may create difficult conflicts? One of Rawls’s answers is with public reason. In general, Rawls is no different from Kant who divides reason into
two major groups, namely, non-public reasoning and public reasoning.
A policy or political decision can achieve legitimacy if such a policy is
mutually acceptable and comprehensible. This cannot be fulfilled by
non-public reasoning. Therefore, Rawls limits the role of non-public
reasoning, which he calls a comprehensive doctrine. Through avoidance of non-public reasoning and by utilizing public reason, Rawls
envisions a society that is stable and harmonious because the established policies are clear and acceptable to the public, as a result of the
maximum avoidance of group logic (Sikka 2016, 94). It is as part of this
framework that religious doctrine has no legitimacy because it is seen as
partial, not comprehensible, and not universally accepted. Nevertheless,
1 In Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledges that the concept of public reason is not a new
concept but an old one that has often been discussed by political philosophers, one of whom
is Immanuel Kant.
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Rawls adds an important point to his concept of public reason by providing a way for religion to exist in the public sphere as long as it provides a
comprehensive doctrinal argument (one of which is religion) supported
by the argument of public reason: a proviso (Sikka 2016, 94–95).
The issue of public reason has been tackled by thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas. Unlike Rawls, Habermas criticizes the proviso because
he thinks that it does not satisfy religious groups. Therefore, he introduced the concept of a translation proviso. Here, religious arguments
can become part of a formal institution (state) if pure religious language
is adapted into an understandable language for the public. Religious
doctrine is not immediately rejected, but embraced, so that it can become accessible to all members of a community, as it also potentially
contains some truth. For Habermas, Rawls’s public reason is a Kantian
form that does not support the formation of a pluralistic cosmopolitan
society, especially for those who are less able to have a dialogue about
religion (Redhead 2015, 87–88). However, Rawls’s proviso and Habermas’s translation proviso do not differ significantly (Sikka 2016, 95).
Henceforth, the concept of public reason became better known as
one that seeks neutrality from elements that favor particular groups,
such as religious doctrine. Kevin Vallier describes public reason as a
concept that requires an action or established policy to be generally
acceptable and understandable (accessible) and to be based on logical
reasoning. Religion or religious doctrine is seen as an inaccessible argument (Vallier 2011, 366–368), so in the realm of public reason, religion
often has no place. Why is that so? This is related to the fact that diversity in communities or societies is assumed to be a positive thing, but
it can be different and even contradictory. To resolve this situation, the
concept of public reason emerged as a solution.
A number of Indonesian scholars have discussed issues regarding the
relationship between Pancasila and public reason. This indicates that
the concept of public reason is seen as interesting and can be used as
a kind of interpretation of the idea of Pancasila itself. Yudi Latif first
discussed it in his book, “State of Plenary: Pancasila History, Rationality and Actuality.” He touched on this issue, particularly when he
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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discussed the idea of the first principle of Pancasila, Belief in the One
and Only God. Latif writes that communities that interact with and
participate in a joint political community can aspire to religious values,
but when they enter an agreement, the next step is the process of public
reason or public deliberation and not religious doctrine. This process is
considered important, as public policy resulting from public reason or
public deliberation is based on a rational, impartial attitude with broad
participation and inclusive characters (Latif 2011, 109).
Before discussing public reason, Latif first highlighted the dichotomy surrounding the position of religion and the state. First, religion
can be placed together with or fused with the state; this is commonly
referred to as a theocracy or the state based on a particular religion.
Another form of this concept is the existence of an official religion in
a political community which is recognized as a reference for policies
related to the public sphere. Second, a country can be very separatist in
terms of the position of religion when dealing with the state. This kind
of country is commonly referred to as a secular state that separates the
role of religion from the state. Religious privatization is a compulsory
song that must be sung in the style of a secular state. Therefore, such
a country is not too concerned with religion, because it does not seem
to have a formal influence or play an important role when the moving
wheel of the state guides people’s lives. These two systems are not approved by Latif. He prefers a third path, neither fusion nor separation,
but differentiation (Latif 2011, 97–109).
This option of differentiation then led Latif to become an intermediary concerning the issue of the position of religion and the state. But
it seems that Latif adopted quite a lot of ideas from other figures such
as Jose Casanova, Robert N. Bellah, and Alfred Stepan. The idea of
differentiation was taken from Casanova, whereas from Bellah, Latif
obviously derived the idea of civil religion. As for Stepan, it can be said
that Latif took the idea of twin toleration.
When discussing the extent of how religion could relate to the state,
Latif seemed to almost combine the ideas of the three intermediary
thinkers. The idea of civil religion, borrowed from Bellah, emerged
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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when Latif described the proximity of Pancasila to the idea of civil
religion, which could involve religious universalism and could be distinguished from religion. With this approach, religion is expected to be
able to become the basis of the state’s political life in its spirit of moralism without making a particular religion the main reference (Latif,
2011, 110).
Casanova’s idea of differentiation became apparent when Latif asserted the rejection of the separation of religion from the state, but
agreed with the differentiation between religious and state authorities
(Latif 2011, 105–109). In this idea of differentiation, religious authority is described differently from state authority. Religious authority is
no longer monopolistic and dominant, as religious institutions in the
medieval West were. Now religion must deal with other institutions and
even share authority and influence. Religion that was once dominant
in many aspects, such as theology, economics, politics, and science, has
now lost its dominance. This is what Casanova later termed differentiation (Knoblauch et al. 2011, 5 and Casanova 2008, 105).
Although this differentiation states that religion can lose its influence compared with what happened in the era of medieval Europe,
religion and the public sphere are not totally separated. Religion can
still play a role in the public sphere and can even influence the political state or community (Knoblauch et al. 2011, 14). This is also what
Latif supported later because, for him, differentiation does not mean
total separation or privatization of religion (Latif 2011, 107). Those are
two things that Latif considered incompatible with the reality of life in
almost all countries.
After establishing this concept of differentiation, Latif then strengthened it with the idea of twin

toleration initiated by Alfred Stepan. Not
much different from Casanova, Stepan was a political expert who also
viewed secularization with the meaning of privatization or total separation between religion and the public sphere (in this context, the state),
which has not been fully implemented in the practice of many Western
countries. In other words, it is not entirely relevant. Stepan conducted
a study of the constitution of Western countries and later concluded
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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that many Western countries (especially in the European region) did
not fully carry out secularization in terms of the total separation of religion and state. A number of countries even have officially established
churches such as Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Norway
(Stepan and Linz 2013, 17). This argument is used by Latif who also
wants to show that the separation and privatization of religion is no
longer relevant.
Not only does Latif draw sociological conclusions and political facts,
but he also provides a prescriptive interpretation that in order to maintain twin toleration, religious ideas must be inspirational, and they must
undergo a process of public reason or public deliberation. Religious
doctrine should not simply refer directly to the scriptures, but must
have some substance, so as to fulfill rational and impartial requirements
(Latif 2011, 109). This is what Latif meant by, “To make religion useful for democratic public life that must be brought to life is the ethical
and prophetic mission of a universal religion, which is directed towards
the realization of mutual benefit by fulfilling deliberative principles.”
(Latif 2011, 120).
With this description, a logical flow of Latif’s view of Pancasila can
be made by utilizing the concept of public reason. It starts by placing
Pancasila as a civil religion that requires it not to be explored in the
form of doctrinal or partial aspirations. At this level, all religions can
meet, because they are considered to have the same universalistic spirit.
The position of religion that plays a role in universal values is
 then synergized with the conception of differentiation that requires religion to
not simply passively exist in the private domain without forging strong
public relations, but rather requires it to also be active in the public
sphere. However, the public sphere in question is more to do with the
empowerment of civil society, the strengthening of society, the control
of state absolutism, and the defense of the independence of others.
Religion is not recommended to be too close to the state or included in
the formulation of state policies. If it is “forced” to enter this process, it
must develop through public reason or public deliberation that requires
rationality and impartiality.
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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Second, we turn to Syamsul Ma’arif who wrote an article entitled
“The Relation between Religion and Politics According to Rawls: Analysis of Pancasila as a Public Reason” (Ma’arif 2006). The style of thinking in Ma’arif’s article barely exceeded what was initiated by Rawls,
starting from the reality of plural community, the original position
(posisi azali), to public reason. These concepts were used by Ma’arif
to research, analyze, and even solve state problems such as relations
between religion and state and between groups of people.
Before arriving at public reason, Ma’arif first discussed Pancasila
as a common ground as seen through the background of Indonesian
people who are diverse in religions, tribes, and ethnicities. Moreover,
the historical existence of Pancasila did emerge from a discussion by
the founding fathers of Indonesia in the Investigating Committee for
Preparatory work for Independence (BPUPKI) to reach an agreement
regarding the basis of the country’s philosophy. At that time, some nationalists wanted a national state that was not based on religion, whereas
Muslims wanted the foundation of the state to be Islamic. Then came
the ideas of Sukarno’s Pancasila that were taken as the founding principles, and the Jakarta Charter was then formulated (Ma’arif 2006, 193).
The elimination of seven words in the Jakarta Charter, in Ma’arif’s
view, was a reflection of the attitude of the founding fathers, especially
those from the Islamic group, and this showed their decision toward the
original position as initiated by Rawls. This attitude intended to negate
interest biases, partial values, and attributes. This thinking behind the
original position then implied that all residents with all their various
social identities were in a free and equal position. More specifically,
there was no majority dictatorship and minority tyranny. What existed
was only a common interest that could only be understood together
(Ma’arif 2006, 195).
What is interesting is that Ma’arif establishes public reason as a way
of reaching common ground (Pancasila) by ignoring the multi-interpretative characteristics of Pancasila. All discourses such as Pancasila
that exist in a diverse country must include public reason as their basis.
Religious arguments cannot be incorporated as long as they have not
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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gone through the process of substantiation, extracting the substance
from religious teachings that were previously not accepted as universal
by other groups. The reason behind the absence of religion in public
discourse is based on the diversity of groups in a community. This
diversity requires that a certain comprehensive doctrine, religion, or
philosophy may not necessarily be understood and accepted by others.
With the medium of public reason, it is expected that the conditions
of non-understanding and non-acceptability can be overcome so that
political deadlock in plural societies can also be avoided (Ma’arif 2006,
197).
Third, Franz Magnis-Suseno also touched on the relation between
Pancasila and John Rawls’s ideas, especially regarding overlapping consensus. In an article entitled “John Rawls, Justice and Pancasila,” Magnis-Suseno juxtaposes Pancasila as a national agreement initiated by a
consensus of Rawls’s ideas around diverse or plural societies (MagnisSuseno 2015, 172–173). This diverse society is a reasonable society, one
in which people have the courage to sit together in order to abandon a
comprehensive doctrine then find a way to reach an agreement between
many parties. This is certainly different from an unreasonable group,
a community group that imposes itself, lives only according to its own
religious doctrine, but also wants other groups to carry out the same
comprehensive doctrine. This situation then brought reasonable societies to a situation called the overlapping consensus (Magnis-Suseno
2015, 170).
After establishing that Pancasila is an overlapping consensus, it is
not too difficult to find traces of public reason in Magnis-Suseno’s ideas
in relation to Pancasila and groups in Indonesia, including religious
groups. This is because public reason with overlapping consensus in the
Rawlsian tradition is an almost inseparable package. It can even be said
that public reason is a logical consequence of overlapping consensus.
How is it possible to separate public reason from Rawlsian thought (including Franz Magnis-Suseno) if from the beginning this overlapping
agreement requires neutral claims such as those made by Rawls?
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Therefore, it is almost impossible to separate public reason from
overlapping consensus, as evidenced by Magnis-Suseno’s logic. This
evidence can be seen when Magnis-Suseno argued about the importance of neutrality and the loss of the comprehensive doctrine of certain religious groups as regards public policy. One example was when
Magnis-Suseno did not agree with the implementation of a number of
local regulations concerning obligations regarding clothing on certain
days for religious reasons. For him, it was a violation of the Indonesian
plurality concerning neutrality and diversity (Magnis-Suseno 2015, 150),
a very Rawlsian thing. Even in executive, legislative, and judicial areas,
religion is also not allowed to play a part. Religion and its institutions
can only enter the public sphere that is related to civil society, not to
the territory of the country.2
Magnis-Suseno does not agree with secularization in the context of
religious privatization, where religion does not have an important role
and influence in the public sphere. For Magnis-Suseno, what can be
done is to reduce the influence of religion on state policy. Apparently,
besides Rawls, the influence of Casanova and Habermas was felt in
Magnis-Suseno’s ideas because they are opponents of the secularization
theory in terms of religious privatization. Both think that the role of
religion can be expanded and must not be narrowed to simply private
spaces.
T H E R E L AT IONSH I P BE T W EEN PU BL IC R E A SON
A N D PA NC A SIL A A N D I T S CR I T ICISM

When examined carefully, there are at least three conclusions that
can be drawn from the views of the above scholars regarding the consequences of the concept of public reason. Furthermore, the consequences become a kind of mandatory axiom that has implications in
providing a basis for the interpretation of Pancasila. Here, the relation

2 For further details, see the interview results with Franz Magnis-Suseno summarized in Conversation with Franz Magnis-Suseno pp. 8–10. Accessible at http://nurcholishmadjid.org/assets/
pdf/pengaruh/Percakapan-dengan-Franz-Magnis-Suseno.pdf (accessed on 22 December 2018).
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between Pancasila and public reason can be evidenced in the views of
the three scholars cited above.
First is the concept of negating majoritarianism. Supporters of public
reason have become almost totally opposed to the idea of majoritarianism. Majoritarianism is interpreted as a socio-political identity that is
embedded in or pinned to a community group that then totally dominates and thus can be distinguished from other community groups.
The early initiators of public reason, such as Rawls and Habermas,
were quite skeptical about majoritarianism in the life of the political
identity of the nation. This is evident from the attitude of those who
do not base themselves in certain comprehensive doctrines (religious
or philosophical doctrines) and prefer other paths that are seen to accommodate diversity (Bailey and Gentile 2015, 4–11).
In a plural society, which has become Rawls’s vision, the big idea
of political liberalism (including original position, overlapping consensus, and public reason) is clearly a concept that does not have room
for majoritarianism. This concept does not allow for a society with
a single identity that has its own conception of goodness that is then
applied or even forced into the body of the political community as a
whole. In contrast, what happens is that society is organized freely and
equally without being based on the concept of the majority–minority
(Koppelman 2017, 289–290). Rawls had the idea to form such a society
because in a political community, society has become so diverse that it
then challenges life’s stability and harmony. It is no wonder then that
the question arises of how to make the community stable in the midst
of this diversity.
In the effort to create a stable society in the midst of this diversity,
there also exists skepticism and there is an almost self-evident conclusion that majoritarianism will lead to something bad. This is what
Latif, Ma’arif, and Magnis-Suseno all think. All three imagine a situation where majoritarianism will cause injustice, authoritarianism, and
oppression. Latif said that the representation of one religious group
can have a negative impact in terms of a decline in the plurality of
nationalities, which is one of the Indonesian characteristics. MajoriPublished by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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tarianism is associated with a religious state, so a brief conclusion can
be reached that states that every instance of majoritarianism, in the
context of Pancasila, will always be directly proportional to the Islamic
state (Latif 2011, 111).
Magnis-Suseno also gave a not very positive description of majoritarianism by stating that partiality toward a group through a policy is
seen as being partial to an exclusive ideology that must be avoided and
is contrary to the diversity of the nation. An example is the wearing of
certain religious clothing that exists in a number of local regulations
(Magnis-Suseno 2015, 150). Such a description of majoritarianism is not
actually separated from the problems that should have been resolved in
the first place so that the conclusions and descriptions used are more
appropriate, or at least majoritarianism can be put in its place. Some
of these problems include historical bias, different facts according to
various political thinkers, and interpretations of the nation’s founders
(originalism).
Concerns about majoritarianism can actually be said to contain historical biases that may not necessarily be justified as different historicity.
This is because the majoritarianism that is promoted by thinkers and
intellectuals is often related to traumatic Western historicity regarding
dark medieval situations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the intellectuals promoting the philosophy of diversity, in other words, those who
object to majoritarianism such as Rawls, will be seen talking about and
showing their antipathy to medieval Western history dominated by the
power of religious institutions. Rawls felt the need to remind us of the
dangerous situation that could occur if religion or religious institutions
were given a predominant role in the state. He also convincingly said
that liberalism generally had its roots in the Church Reform movement and was known as one of the contributors that undermined the
power of religious institutions (Laborde 2017, 92). This further shows
that historical trauma in general cannot be erased from the memory of
intellectuals who initiated theories of diversity, although there is a great
distance between the era of the hegemony of religious institutions in
Europe and the modern era.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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The same attitude was also shown by Cecile Laborde, a political
theorist supporting liberal egalitarianism. This attitude supports the
state in not endorsing certain religions or religious institutions in relation to the state. When supporting the idea of liberal egalitarianism, Laborde apparently could not let go of the historical trauma of
the West’s dark history. This can be detected from the way in which
Laborde brought up Locke’s defense of the plurality of understandings
from the grip of the monopoly of religious institutions and the need
to trim the role of religion in the public sphere (Laborde 2017, 15).
Laborde frankly acknowledged that one reason why the idea emerged
regarding liberating the state from the influence of a comprehensive
doctrine such as religion is that there had been acute conflicts in the
past, so liberal countries needed a standpoint that did not refer to one
religious doctrine (Laborde 2018, 5). Laborde was referring to the history of religious wars and the hegemony of religious institutions in the
West in the Middle Ages.
So, it can be said that often Western thinkers who try to stay away
from majoritarianism, especially when carried out by religion or religious institutions, have directly or indirectly experienced their own
historical trauma. This historical bias is then multiplied in the many
analyses and philosophies of the thinkers that are then reproduced in
the ideas and logic of intellectuals, both directly and indirectly. A particular criticism of the intellectuals who oppose majoritarianism is the
self-evident conclusion that majoritarianism, especially that practiced
by religious groups, will lead to authoritarianism and the oppression
of minority groups. It is an argument that is very traumatic in terms
of history, even though not all forms of majoritarianism will lead to
authoritarianism.
This historical trauma cannot necessarily be justified by other histories. The Ottoman government of Turkey, for example, was very tolerant
of the minorities of a number of religious followers so they could carry
out their religious internal regulations under the leadership of religious
leaders (Kia 2011, 112 and Hefner 2014, 640). Another example is the
government of Umar ibn Khattab who developed a life of tolerance
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2019
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toward Christian minority groups in Jerusalem through the Aelia Agreement (Rubin 2011, 52).
Moreover, majoritarianism does not always exist in tandem with a
religious state. Majoritarianism, to a certain extent, can also co-exist
with a system of other ideas, including liberalism. A number of multiculturalist liberal intellectuals who defend diversity are not narrowed
by the majoritarianism logic previously rejected by intellectuals who
tended to be liberal. The logic of majoritarianism, as discussed by liberal multiculturalists, is related to the extent to which liberalism can
accommodate religious minorities, when in liberal political communities, these religious minorities have aspirations and practices that are
contrary to the liberal majority.
In addressing this question, political theorists started to practice the
logic of majoritarianism, as evidenced by Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz,
and Robert Quong. Kymlicka’s viewpoint that includes the logic of
majoritarianism can be seen when he talks about a number of religious
minorities such as the Hutterite or the Amish who have different views
to liberalism; they can even be thought of as violating the principles
of liberalism. The case referred to by Kymlicka was one that occurred
in the midst of the Hutterite community when members who left were
then asked to give up their ownership rights. This obligation to give up
ownership of property, by the Hutterite community, was seen as a consequence of the members leaving the group. When the case was brought
to court, the Hutterite community won. This was later criticized by
Kymlicka who said that the decision was wrong, because the Hutterite
minority community was seen as violating the principle of liberalism
held by the majority (Cohen-Almagor 2018, 19).
Kymlicka did not take steps against religious minorities that tended
to be illiberal, but he continued to provide a broad space for liberalism
and for activists who were committed to the principles of liberalism.
This helped to maintain social pressure so that principles of liberalism,
as shared by the majority, were accepted by minority groups. If religious
minorities had practiced severe violations such as slavery, genocide, and
mass murder, the state may have intervened (Courtois 2008, 48).
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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Moreover, Kymlicka was very skeptical of internal restrictions that
were often practiced by religious minorities.3 On another occasion, he
strongly discouraged the state from providing group rights in the context
of internal restrictions. He took this action because he did not want the
rights of minority groups to undermine the principles of liberalism held
by the majority (Stjernfelt 2012, 56).
A similar attitude is also held by Raz on more or less the same issue,
which is the extent to which liberalism, as held by the majority, has
a number of rights that must be respected. This is reflected in Raz’s
idea that emphasizes the importance of the liberal majority, promotes
the understanding of secularism, and has an obligation to promote
the value of the majority in the context of a state, so that the state as a
representation of liberal values becomes the guardian of liberalism. Any
group that rejects secularism is not a liberal group (Harding 2014, 248).
Indeed, Raz does not recommend non-liberal groups to use repressive actions that cause them to be oppressed and depressed. However,
minority groups are encouraged to continue to integrate with the dominant liberal values. Raz’s attitude shows that the dominant liberal values
must be supported and cannot be defeated by minority values when
there is a clash between the two (Kim 2015, 72).
The same attitude is also shown by Jonathan Quong. This contemporary liberal thinker also cannot tolerate the notion of illiberal minorities who have the right to justify the illiberalism of the minorities. In
Quong’s view, minority groups can only have rights related to citizenship. Their citizenship rights cannot be eliminated simply because the
group rejects liberalism. However, these minorities do not have the
right to hold illiberal rights. Illiberal rights are those used to practice
activities or objectives that do not respect the principles of freedom and
equality. Such groups cannot have rights if they continue to carry out
illiberalism (Ekeli 2012, 186).

3 Group rights, in the context of providing limitations, are exercised by a group (particularly
minority groups) for the rights of its members in order to maintain internal harmony and stabilization.
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For Quong, the system of liberal ideas has the privilege of limiting
the use of a right. This means that a certain group has rights, except in
contexts where the group cannot exercise their right as a way of pursuing non-liberal objectives, or in Quong’s terminology, it is called an
unreasonable objective. Some concrete examples are given by Quong,
such as not having the right to enact hate speech or not having the
right to join an organization or political party that is racist. Additionally,
there is no right to fight for a racist party to be elected in the general
election (Ekeli 2012, 187).
For political liberals such as Quong, a rather restrictive method can
only be carried out if a group or person has exceeded what is called
public justification that includes several things, such as (1) the fact of
reasonable pluralism, (2) reasonable citizens, (3) political conception,
(4) overlapping consensus, and (5) public reason. Therefore, illiberal
citizens, in Quong’s terminology, are known as unreasonable citizens
and are included in one of the conditions for a restriction to be applied.
This is where we can see the relevance of majoritarianism in Quong’s
ideas (Vallier 2017, 177).
Examples of the attitudes of liberals increasingly show that majoritarianism not only is the monopoly of religious institutions or religious
ideas but also lives and develops in the intellectual environment of liberals. In such a situation, it is no exaggeration to say that the majoritarianism that is often pinned to religious groups, and also often accused
of being authoritarian, has now become irrelevant or simply a myth
that is more stigmatized than factual. In the end, the rivals of religious
groups, such as liberals, also adopt majoritarianism without hesitation.
It could also be that the existence and development of majoritarianism among Western liberals proves that majoritarianism is a destiny or
intellectual way of thinking. It can be seen how the majority must remain being a factor that is considered even a determinant in the end of
a policy, agreement, or legal adoption. Therefore, the point that should
be a common concern, especially in Pancasila, is not the total rejection
of majoritarianism, but rather the rejection of a type of majoritarianism
that has turned authoritarian and tyrannical. Likewise, we should reject
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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the claim that every type of majoritarianism will certainly turn out to be
authoritarian. Taking into account these concerns, majoritarianism can
be put back in its proper place, without having to negate it totally. The
total negation and bad press of majoritarianism, as often carried out by
liberals, will eventually “backfire,” as is happening with a number of
liberal intellectuals who eventually adopted majoritarianism.
Thus, trying to relate Pancasila to public reason, which then has
consequences for anti-majoritarianism, seems inappropriate. Moreover,
majoritarianism has also been adopted by liberals as a consequence of
the demands of society. This should also apply to Pancasila. Therefore,
Pancasila cannot be separated from majoritarianism in certain regards
as with other ideas. Separating Pancasila from majoritarianism can
actually lead to the neglect of society’s ideals while leading to an ahistorical attitude toward the will of the nation’s founders, as majoritarianism can be traced back to the interpretation of a number of founding
fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman Singodimedjo,
and Mohammad Natsir.
Wahid Hasyim, despite being mentioned as having agreed to the
omission of seven words in the Jakarta Charter, still has the spirit to
fight for Islamic values (as the majority) without having to tyrannize
the minorities. For him, fighting for Islamic values (Shari’a) can be
done in a democratic way, between divinity and popular sovereignty.
Moreover, another important thing is to do this without causing harm
to minorities (Hasyim 2015, 938).4
Likewise, Agus Salim requires that public policies and laws issued by
the state do not conflict with the teachings of the scriptures, especially
the Qur’an. He even justifies his argument by citing the verse from alQur’an (Salim 1984, 438).5 This reflects Agus Salim’s attitude, which
4 Wahid Hasyim wrote, “The desire of Muslims as the largest group and our nation will revive
the religious shari’a given good paths and channels, but from the other side the principle of
democracy is maintained so that the desire does not harm other groups. If here is explained
about the existence of a compromise with democracy, it does not mean that if there is no compromise, there will certainly be things that are urgent and detrimental to the small number of
religiously motivated groups.”
5 Agus Salim wrote, “If it will be in accordance with our basis of Pancasila, regardless of the
directions that are important to the various religious thoughts, and whatever efforts to try or fight
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considers the majority as one of the important aspects in making the
laws that will affect the politics of the state.
Other Islamic figures also agreed with Wahid Hasyim and Agus
Salim, as indicated by Kasman Singodimedjo. As a member of the PPKI
(Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) and the first
Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, Kasman argues that the
phrase “Belief in the One and Only God” has a strong meaning for the
implementation of the Shari’a. Such a relation is inseparable because
of either the sociological reality, where the majority is Muslims, or
the interpretation of the constitutional language. That is why Kasman
appealed to the Islamic community to be not too concerned with the
changes in the phrase of the first principle (sila) of the Jakarta Charter
by eliminating the seven words to be “Belief in the One and Only God”
(Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman 1981, 124–127).6
Singodimedjo’s interpretation was reinforced by the views of Mohammad Natsir, the leader of Masyumi and the first Prime Minister
of the parliamentary cabinet after the dissolution of the RIS (Republic of United States of Indonesia). He believes that the interpretation
of Pancasila cannot and should not conflict with religious teachings,
especially Islam, as embraced by the majority of Indonesian citizens.
For him, the interpretation of Pancasila that is contrary to Islam will
be problematic and contradictory to the substance of Pancasila itself
(Natsir 1978, 246–247).7
for each of their objectives, the first and foremost, they cannot violate the first basic principle,
i.e., Belief in the One Supreme God. Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to deviate from
the religious laws which are based on the revelation rather than the God Almighty according
to the word of Allah in Al-Qur’an three consecutive times, namely S. Almaidah.”
6 Kasman Singodimedjo wrote, “And all interpretations of the Belief in the One Supreme God,
both according to their historical interpretation and their meanings and understandings, are in
accordance with the interpretation given by Islam, namely the prevailing religion and treated
in Indonesia, the religion adhered to by more than 90 percent.” Kasman wrote again, “They
forget, that God Almighty in Pancasila and the Constitution guarantees the upholding of God’s
law, namely Islam with its manifestations (al-Quran).”
7 Mohammad Natsir wrote, “We hope that Pancasila in its journey of seeking content since it
was established, will not be filled with teachings that oppose al-Quran. Divine revelations that
have for centuries become the blood of flesh for most of our nation. And it should also not be
used to oppose the implementation of the rules and teachings contained in al-Quran … which
they want to contribute the content to the formation and development of the nation and state
in a parliamentary and democratic way.”
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Considering that the anti-majoritarianism attitude tends to contain
an acute historical bias and that majoritarianism is a social disposition
that is adopted by almost all existing systems of ideas and considers the
interpretations of the founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus
Salim, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Mohammad Natsir, the attitude
of total rejection of majoritarianism is one that is not philosophically
valid and cannot be defended. What is needed is not total rejection of
majoritarianism, but proper introduction at the right moment.
Second is the principle of a neutral state. The adoption of public
reason also requires groups within a diverse political community to be
neutral and distance themselves from certain values or comprehensive
doctrines, whether from a religion or a philosophy. This certainty can
be seen from the attitudes of Latif and Magnis-Suseno, which require
a neutral policy in terms of the state. Latif said that the state must not
be inclined to one single religion so that it will not only be represented
by one religion (Latif 2011, 119).
This issue of a neutral state has also become a fierce point of discussion between contemporary political theorists. The question that revolves around the issue of neutrality is what is meant exactly by neutrality. Furthermore, is it possible for neutrality to be achieved? In general,
neutrality has at least four meanings. The first meaning is neutrality
of outcome, i.e., the results of a policy or political decision do not have
an impact only on certain groups. When it affects only certain groups,
the neutrality of outcomes cannot be achieved. The second is neutrality
of opportunity, the claim that all ways of life, doctrines, or groups are
given equal opportunities in order to guarantee freedom and equality.
Next, is neutrality of justification, namely, the claim that new policies
can be achieved neutrally if policies or decisions do not use justifications that come from certain groups within a political community. The
last is neutrality of aim, the claim that a new neutrality will be achieved
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if the issued policies or political decisions do not promote the values or
conceptions of goodness that certain groups hold (Franken 2016, 3–5).
Of the four variants of neutrality, the last two neutralities (justification and aim) are variants that are often discussed by scholars. The
first two variants, neutrality of outcome and opportunity, tend to be
abandoned because they are considered difficult to achieve. Neutrality
of outcome cannot be achieved because it is considered difficult to realize consistently in practice. It is deemed difficult as sometimes a policy
requires segmentation. For example, smoking bans in certain areas will
provide less space for smokers than for non-smokers. Non-smokers can
carry out their activities anywhere, whereas smoker segmentation means
that smokers have less space because they are prohibited in various
public spheres, so the policy is considered not neutral to smokers. The
same applies to neutrality of opportunity. The concept of neutrality that
tries to provide equal space and freedom is unable to provide equality
and freedom to all ideas of value and goodness that are often adopted
by certain groups (Franken 2016, 5).
For these reasons, Franken states that it is more possible to maintain
neutrality of justification and aim than neutrality of outcome and opportunity. But can neutrality of justification and aim be maintained
or valid as concepts that are indeed worth developing? This question
results in a certain degree of doubt and can be raised again as a method
of evaluating the concept of a neutral state that has been firmly held by
liberals and a number of Indonesian intellectuals.
Doubts about the validity of neutrality of justification arose when
Rawls, a defender of neutrality of justification, failed to escape the
partiality of certain ideas of goodness. In this context, this is a concept
of liberal goodness. At first, Rawls was quite confident that the ideas of
political liberalism that he built along with various microconceptions
(public reason, overlapping consensus, veils of ignorance, and others)
could be neutral as they were based on universal equality and freedom
for all. However, when talking about political liberalism, Rawls had to
rely on the notion of capacity as a concept of goodness, one which gives
individuals the freedom to form, revise, and pursue a concept of goodhttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v4i2.203

22

Chaniago: Examining Pancasila’s Position in the Public Reason Scheme: A Cri
EXAMINING PANCASILA’S POSITION IN THE PUBLIC REASON SCHEME

205

ness that is typical of the characteristics of liberal autonomy. As a result,
Rawls was stuck in the autonomy trap that he has previously refused.
Autonomy is indeed the basis of liberalism, which is as important as
other bases of liberalism (Franken 2016, 17).
To give a concrete example, Rawls’s inconsistency was seen in the
case of Wisconsin V. Yoder when the Supreme Court of the United
States of America ruled that children aged 14 years and over from
Amish minority groups were excluded from the obligation to study.
For Rawls, the Supreme Court’s decision was not right because liberal
countries must provide a basis for capacity as a concept of goodness
so that individuals may choose, revise, and pursue this in their lives.
Moreover, it can easily be provided to its citizens by having compulsory education. But according to Franken, Rawls cannot be neutral
because when he convinced the state to participate in encouraging
the principles of autonomous liberalism (by educating its citizens to
be autonomous in their attitude and manner), he had taken sides with
autonomous liberalism (Franken 2016, 18).
Thus, in truth, neutrality cannot be truly neutral, even though it is
affirmed by supporters of neutrality as a form of neutrality. This impossibility is caused because parties competing in a system or in a policy
formulation will side with one of two or several competitors. When
policies are formulated automatically, they will attract one competitor
and reject the other. This includes when a value competes with another
value. At one point, a value will be adopted and the other rejected
(Breen 2009, 549–550). That is what has caused a number of political
scholars, from liberals such as William Galston, Charles Larmore, and
Bruce Ackerman, to acknowledge that policies or the selection of truly
neutral values as envisioned by supporters of neutral states cannot actually be achieved (Breen 2009, 549).
Additionally, linking state neutrality, both in the form of neutrality
of justification or neutrality of aim, to Pancasila also does not demonstrate a valid argument. This is due to the historical characteristics of
Pancasila itself, as interpreted by Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman,
and Natsir, who wanted religion to influence all state policies. Wahid
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Hasyim wanted it in the form of a struggle for Islamic values (Shari’a)
that were active in state institutions and society, whereas Agus Salim
wanted it in a more passive form of reviewing how regulatory state
products and institutions did not come into conflict with basic religious
values. That means, in fact, that the state is not always neutral. In certain circumstances, the state needs justification from the religious realm
as the implementation of divinity, which became the first principle of
Pancasila.
This also causes the neutrality of justification and aim, as derivatives of public reason, to not always able to be used when interpreting
Pancasila. For example, in LGBT cases, it will be difficult to apply the
principle of public reason in the form of neutrality of justification or
neutrality of aim. Pancasila wants the religious doctrine to influence
the state whereas public reason does not because it is seen as incompatible with neutrality of justification and aim. This shows that Pancasila
and public reason and its derivatives, especially neutrality of justification or of aim, are incompatible.
A similar case occurred in a debate about adultery that led to many
intellectual debates between the groups that wanted an article of law to
be included in the national legal regulations and groups that opposed it.
One of the arguments used by the group rejecting sanctions for adultery
was public reason, as they believed that religion does not affect the state,
including the state authority to restrict and sanction adultery.
Third is the principle of substantial elements in religion (universalism). The consequence that is often mentioned in terms of the relation
between Pancasila and public reason is to raise the value of religion,
which is considered universal, to leave a partial value that is considered
as not representing togetherness. In Latif’s view, this is described as
the application of Pancasila as the embodiment of civil religion (Latif
2011, 110).
The series of discourses that Latif brought were consistent with those
brought by Nurcholish Madjid. Madjid himself was greatly influenced
by Robert N. Bellah who was quite famous for the idea of civil religion.
The question that then arose was whether it was right to take Bellah’s
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol4/iss2/13
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concept of civil religion and draw Madjid’s conclusions that religion
could only be drawn into the realm of the state as long as it affected
universal issues?
The universalization that Nurcholish Madjid referred to was meant
to draw religious teachings substantially closer. It is very close to the
idea of Protestant ethics that is popular in the United States (US) and
the idea of civil religion as put forward by Robert N. Bellah.8 According
to Madjid, the US is the best example of drawing the line of Christianity through the process of universalization so that it becomes something
universal. Through the process of universalization, Christian values that

exist in US society appear to be not exclusive and can be accepted by
groups outside of Christianity from something previously exclusive and
particular. Values such

as freedom, legal order, personal rights, and human rights are universal things that can be understood by all interfaith
circles. Thus, these values later

became a kind of civil religion, although
the individual religious commitment of each individual was not lost. A
person can still support human rights, freedom, and legal order from
their respective religious bases. However, when drawn to a level that
is no longer personal (political, legal, and public), the base becomes a
civil religion with its universal value (Madjid 1998, 171–172).
Hence, it can be said that this universalization was then used by
Madjid as one component of Pancasila relating to the interpretation of
the divinity principle (Belief in the One and Only God). This can be
seen from his conversation that presented the idea of universalization
against the background of Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution. In fact,
he encouraged Pancasila to adopt what was initiated by Bellah.
With Madjid’s explanation, one can see and understand the direction desired by those who want to raise the issue of universalism. Universalism can be said to be derivative or inseparable from the idea of
public reason. Therefore, intellectuals who relate Pancasila to public
reason often raise the idea of universalization as it was built by Nurcholish Madjid, who borrowed Bellah’s ideas, and later applied them in
the context of Pancasila. He thinks that there is a belief that Pancasila
8 Regarding the ideas of Robert N. Bellah concerning civil religion, see Bortolini (2012).
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and public reason are always directly proportional, even though it is
not always so.
Such universalization efforts can be questioned because the relationship between Pancasila and religion does not always derive from
universal ideas as evidenced by Latif and Madjid. A number of national
founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman, and
Natsir did not necessarily use universalization as the only way to explain
the relationship between Pancasila and religion, as explained earlier
regarding their attitude towards Islam.
Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 is one example that can show how universalization with the characteristics of public reason does not always fit
with Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution, so that in a moment of universalization it becomes invalid. This Law, when placed on a universal
scale, instead represents the phenomenon of adopting religious ideas,
because in a liberal country, religious sects that give new interpretations
that are disassociated from the core doctrines of religion are not being
restricted by the state, so they are different from what is applied in that
Law. In Indonesia, the misinterpretation of religious principles can be
seen as blasphemy.9
Liberal states did not apply restrictions because of the influence of
Locke’s ideas. As a figure who viewed religion and state as different authorities, Locke, a pioneer figure in 18th century Western liberalism, opposed religious and state restrictions on religious groups that interpreted
religion differently to the main religion, though religious interpretations
are an essential part of a religion. For Locke, religious restrictions are
not universal, so restrictions cannot be applied to different religious
groups. Locke agreed to restrictions on an activity if universal areas
were affected, such as existence (life), health, ownership, and other
freedoms. Restrictive authorities are carried out by state institutions
rather than religious institutions (Alzate 2014, 225).
Besides, the idea of religious universalism relates to secularization
because religious universalism is another form of differentiation, as
described by a number of sociologists such as Jose Casanova and Steve
9 This happened to Ahmadiyah Indonesia. For the dynamics of the debate, see Burhani (2014).
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Bruce (Hood 2015, 244 and Bruce 2011, 49).10 The close relation between universalism and differentiation lies in the placement of religion
in the domain of civil society, and given that religion cannot influence
state politics, it only fills the political area of the state as an ideal and
not as a doctrinal aspiration. When religion is separated in the area of
civil society, it leaves the state to be filled with content that is considered universal. As explained by Nurcholish Madjid, religion was drawn
to issues such as compliance to legal order, freedom, personal rights,
and other kinds of freedom that became cross-religious issues. As mentioned by Casanova, differentiation is a variant of secularization which
means a distinction between religious institutions (church institutions)
and secular institutions (state, economy, science, art, entertainment,
health, and welfare) whose process dates from pre-modern to contemporary (Casanova 2011, 54). Therefore, it is not appropriate for Latif
to say that Indonesia (Pancasila), which is neither a secular state nor
a religious state, is then aligned with the distinctive differentiation of
Casanova (Latif 2011, 111) because Pancasila does not legitimize this
form of secularization.
With this criticism, the future interpretation of Pancasila must abandon models such as anti-majoritarianism, the neutral state, and universalism, which are not properly placed. The interpretation of Pancasila
that must be developed is one that treats majoritarianism moderately,
especially religious majoritarianism, because Pancasila is based on
“Belief in the One and Only God.” The principles of majoritarianism
must be considered and should not be violated, so that on a number
of issues, it must be in favor of the majority (not the neutral state).
Majoritarianism must be valued and can affect many policies. There
should be no policies conflicting with religious doctrines, especially the
majority religion. The impact of universalism must be put in its place
without having to abandon the religious doctrines as interpretations
10 Bruce and Casanova explained the term differentiation with slight differences. Although
Bruce and Casanova’s general ideas about differentiation seem similar, Bruce explained differentiation in the context where religious influences in the public sector are disappearing,
whereas Casanova believed that such influences were still there, especially in civil society as
he noticed a de-privatization of religion, not the other way around.
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of the principle of “Belief in the One and Only God.” However, this
model of understanding does not mean adhering to majoritarianism,
which is tyrannical and oppresses minorities. The impact of tyranny
on minorities should be avoided as much as possible because one of
the important principles of constitutionalism is protecting minorities.
CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion describes how relating the interpretation of
Pancasila with public reason is not always right. Many aspects linked
to the relationship between them are questionable in terms of their
relevance because public reason itself provides certain derivative consequences that can come under criticism. The three derivative consequences, anti-majoritarianism, neutral state, and universalism, cannot be applied to Pancasila, so the relationship between Pancasila and
public reason is not always positive. In one aspect of Pancasila, it must
avoid anti-majoritarianism, as practiced by almost all existing systems
of ideas, including the one that dominates the world, liberalism, as long
as majoritarianism is carried out without oppressing minority groups.
Pancasila, in certain regards, also shows that it cannot be described
as neutral, as Pancasila indeed describes one variety of options, as other
systems of ideas also do. Therefore, it cannot be considered as neutral.
Moreover, to a certain degree, Pancasila must use religious justifications.
Finally, Pancasila cannot forever focus on universalism as a modus
vivendi. This does not mean that Pancasila cannot be applied to universal issues. It can still be used as an approach to universal issues as long
as it is not deterministic and stays true to its nature, which is to promote
religious values. Evidently, Indonesia still treats certain matters in the
realm of universalism, which are not all universalistic, as defined by a
number of figures such as the idea of civil religion by Robert N. Bellah.
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